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Abstract—We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic
that makes use only of packet timing information on the uplink.
This attack is therefore impervious to existing packet padding
defences. In addition, unlike existing approaches this timing-only
attack does not require knowledge of the start/end of web fetches
and so is effective against traffic streams. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of the attack against both wired and wireless traffic,
achieving mean success rates in excess of 90%. In addition to
being of interest in its own right, this timing-only attack serves to
highlight deficiencies in existing defences and so to areas where it
would be beneficial for Virtual Private Network (VPN) designers
to focus further attention.
Keywords—traffic analysis, website fingerprinting, timing-only
attacks, network privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider an attacker of the type illustrated
in Figure 1. The attacker can detect the time when packets
traverse the encrypted tunnel in the uplink direction, but has
no other information about the clients’ activity. The attacker’s
objective is to use this information to guess, with high proba-
bility of success, the web sites which the client visits. What is
distinctive about the attack considered here is that the attacker
relies solely on packet timestamp information whereas the
previously reported attacks against encrypted web traffic have
mainly made use of observations of packet size and/or packet
count information.
Our interest in timing-only attacks is twofold. Firstly, packet
padding is a relatively straightforward defence against attacks
that rely primarily on packet size, and indeed is currently
either already available or being implemented in a number
of popular VPNs [2]. Secondly, alternative attacks based on
packet counting [2], [3] are insensitive to packet padding
defences but require partitioning of a packet stream into
individual web fetches in order for the number of packets
associated with each web fetch to be determined, which may
be highly challenging in practice on links where there are no
clear pauses between web fetches. In contrast, packet timing-
based attacks are not only largely unaffected by packet padding
defences but also, as we will show, do not require partitioning
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Fig. 1: Schematic illustrating attacker of the type considered.
A client machine is connected to an external network via
an encrypted tunnel (ssh, SSL, IPSec etc.). The attacker
can detect the time when packets traverse the tunnel in the
uplink direction, but has no other information about the clients
activity.
of the packet stream. Hence, they are potentially a practically
important class of attack against current and future VPNs.
While some work has been carried out using inter-arrival time
information to classify the application (HTTP, IMAP etc.) [8],
to our knowledge, there is no previous work reporting use
of timing information alone to construct a successful attack
against encrypted web traffic.
The main contributions of the present paper are as follows:
(i) we describe an attack against encrypted web traffic that
uses packet timing information alone, (ii) we demonstrate that
this attack is highly effective against both wired and wireless
traffic, achieving mean success rates in excess of 90% over
ethernet and wireless tunnels and a success rate of 58% against
Tor traffic, (iii) we also demonstrate that the attack is effective
against traffic streams i.e. back to back web page fetches where
the packet boundaries between fetches are unknown.
In addition to being of interest in its own right, particularly
in view of the powerful nature of the attack, this timing-only
attack also serves to highlight deficiencies in existing defences
and so to areas where it would be beneficial for VPN designers
to focus further attention. We note that, complementary to the
present work, in [3] it is demonstrated that when the web fetch
boundaries within a packet stream are known then an NGRAM
approach using packet count together with uplink/downlink
direction information is also sufficient to construct an effective
attack against encrypted web traffic despite packet padding.
Hence, we can conclude that (i) uplink/downlink packet order-
ing plus web fetch boundaries and (ii) uplink/downlink packet
timing information are both sensitive quantities that ought to
be protected by a secure encrypted tunnel. Packet padding does
not protect these quantities. Directing defences against these
two sets of packet stream features therefore seems an important
direction for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The general topic of traffic analysis has been the subject of
much interest, and a large body of literature exists. Some of
the earliest work specifically focussed on attacks and defences
for encrypted web traffic appears to be that of Hintz [7], which
considers the SafeWeb encrypting proxy. In this setup (i) web
page fetches occur sequentially with the start and end of each
web page fetch known, and for each packet (ii) the client-
side port number, (iii) the direction (incoming/outgoing) and
(iv) the size is observed. A web page signature is constructed
consisting of the aggregate bytes received on each port (calcu-
lated by summing packet sizes), effectively corresponding to
the number and size of each object within the web page. In [15]
it is similarly assumed that the number and size of the objects
in a web page can be observed and using this information a
classification success rate of 75% is reported.
Subsequently, Bissias et al [1] considered an encrypted
tunnel setup where (i) web page fetches occur sequentially
with the start and end of each web page fetch known, and for
each packet (ii) the size, (iii) the direction (incoming/outgoing)
and (iv) the time (and so also the packet ordering) is observed.
The sequence of packet inter-arrival times and packet sizes
from a web page fetch is used to create a profile for each
web page in a target set and the cross correlation between an
observed traffic sequence and the stored profiles is then used
as a measure of similarity. A classification accuracy of 23% is
observed when using a set of 100 web pages, rising to 40%
when restricted to a smaller set of web pages.
Most later work has adopted essentially the same model as
[1], making use of packet direction and size information and
assuming that the packet stream has already been partitioned
into individual web page fetches. For example in [16] the
timing information is not considered in the feature set, hence
the attack can be countered with defences such as BuFLO
in [3] leading to a success rate of only 10%. In [10], [6]
Bayes classifiers based on the direction and size of packets
are considered while in [14] an SVM classifier is proposed.
In [11] classification based on direction and size of packets
is studied using Levenshtein distance as the similarity metric,
in [13] using a Gaussian Bag-of-Words approach and in [16]
using K-NN classification. In [2] using a SVM approach a
classification accuracy of over 80% is reported for both SSH
and Tor traffic and the defences considered were generally
found to be ineffective. Similarly, [3] considers Bayes and
SVM classifiers and finds that a range of proposed defences
are ineffective. In [5] remote inference of packet sizes from
queueing delay is studied.
III. ANATOMY OF A WEB PAGE FETCH
When traffic is carried over an encrypted tunnel, such as a
VPN, the packet source and destination addresses and ports
and the packet payload are hidden. We also assume here that
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Fig. 2: Time traces of uplink traffic from 5 different Irish
health-related web sites are shown. It can be seen that the
web site time traces exhibit distinct patterns. The traces are
shifted vertically to avoid overlap and facilitate comparison.
the tunnel pads the packets to be of equal size, so that packet
size information is also concealed, and that the start and end of
an individual web fetch may also be concealed e.g. when the
web fetch is embedded in a larger traffic stream. An attacker
sniffing traffic on the encrypted tunnel is therefore able only to
observe the direction and timing of packets through the tunnel,
i.e. to observe a sequence of pairs {(tk, dk)}, k = 1, 2, · · ·
where tk is the time at which the k-th packet is observed
and dk ∈ {−1, 1} indicates whether the packet is travelling
in the uplink or downlink direction. Our experiments on use
of uplink, downlink and uplink+downlink traffic suggest that
downlink traffic provides no additional information regarding
timing patterns over uplink traffic. The reason is that the timing
of ACKs in uplink traffic is correlated to that of downlink
packets which means that using only uplink traffic provides
sufficient information. Furthermore it may be easier for an
eavesdropper to access unmodified uplink traffic on the first
hop, (given the traffic comes immediately from the source,
while the corresponding downlink traffic could be morphed us-
ing inter-flow transformations e.g. flow mixing, split and merge
[17]). We therefore focus on an attacker that can only observe
the timestamps {tk}, k ∈ Kup := {κ ∈ {1, 2, · · · } : dκ = −1}
associated with uplink traffic.
Figure 2 plots the timestamps {tk} of the uplink packets sent
during the course of fetching five different health-related web
pages (see below for details of the measurement setup). The x-
axis indicates the packet number k within the stream and the y-
axis the corresponding timestamp tk in seconds. It can be seen
that these timestamp traces are distinctly different for each web
site, and it is this observation that motivates interest in whether
timing analysis may by itself (without additional information
such as packet size, uplink/downlink packet ordering etc.) be
sufficient to successfully de-anomymise encrypted web traffic.
To gain insight into the differences between the packet
timestamp sequences in Figure 2 and, importantly, whether
they are genuinely related to characteristics of each web page
rather than to other factors, it is helpful to consider the process
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Fig. 3: This figure represent a typical web site query. It starts by requesting the index page. Then as the browser parses through
this page more objects are fetched in parallel. Some objects may also be outsourced to 3rd party web sites which have their own
pipelines. Dynamic content may be updated at intervals, as indicated in the last two lines of the figure, and connections tend to
close in groups.
of fetching a web page in more detail. To fetch a web page
the client browser starts by opening a TCP connection with
the server indicated by the URL and issues an HTTP GET or
POST request to which the server then replies. As the client
parses the server response it issues additional GET/POST
requests to fetch embedded objects (images, css, scripts etc.).
These additional requests may be to different servers from
the original request (e.g. when the object to be fetched is an
advert or is hosted in a separate content-delivery network),
in which case the client opens a TCP connection to each
new server in order to issue the requests. Fetching of these
objects may in turn trigger the fetching of further objects.
Note that asynchronous fetching of dynamic content using,
e.g. AJAX, can lead to a complex sequence of server requests
and responses even after the page has been rendered by the
browser. Also, typically the TCP connections to the various
servers are held open until the page is fully loaded so that
they can be reused for later requests (request pipelining in this
way is almost universally used by modern browsers).
This web fetch process is illustrated schematically in Figure
3. We make the following more detailed observations:
1) Connection to third-party servers. Fetching an object
located on a third-party server requires the opening of a
new TCP connection to that server, over which the HTTP
request is then sent. The TCP connection handshake
introduces a delay (of at least one RTT) and since the
pattern of these delays is related to the web page content
it can potentially assist in identifying the web page.
2) Pipelining of requests. Multiple objects located on the
same server lead to several GET/POST requests being
sent to that server, one after another. Due to the dynamics
of TCP congestion control, this burst of back-to-back
requests can affect the timing of the response packets in a
predictable manner that once again can potentially assist
in identifying the web page.
3) Asynchronous requests. Dynamic content, e.g. pre-
fetching via AJAX, can lead to update requests to a server
with large inter-arrival times that can potentially act as a
web page signature.
4) Connection closing. When a web page fetch is com-
pleted, the associated TCP connections are closed. A
FIN/FINACK/ACK exchange closes each connection and
this burst of packets can have quite distinctive timing
which allows it to be identified. Since the number of
connections is related to the number of distinct locations
where objects in the web page are stored, it changes
between web pages.
Our aim is to use timing features such as these, which vary
depending upon the web page fetched, to create a timing
signature which allows us to identify which web page is being
fetched based on timing data only.
IV. COMPARING SEQUENCES OF PACKET TIMESTAMPS
Suppose we have two sequences of packet timestamps t :=
{ti}, i = 1, 2, · · · , n and t′ := {t′j}, j = 1, 2, · · · ,m. Note
that for simplicity we re-label the uplink packet indices to start
from 1 and to increase consecutively since none of our analysis
will depend on this. Note also that the sequence lengths n and
m are not assumed to be the same. To proceed we need to
define an appropriate measure of the distance between such
sequences.
A. Network Distortion of Timestamp Sequences
The packet stream observed during a web page fetch is affected
by network events during the fetch. Changes in download
rate (e.g. due to flows starting/finishing within the network)
tend to stretch/compress the times between packets. Queueing
within the network also affects packet timing, with queued
packets experiencing both greater delay and tending to be
more bunched together. Link-layer retransmission on wireless
links has a similar effect to queueing. Similarly to changes in
download rate, the effect is primarily to stretch/compress the
times between packets.
Packet loss introduces a “hole” in the packet stream where
the packet ought to have arrived and also affects the timing
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Fig. 4: Illustrating impact of changes in packet loss on the
packet timestamp sequence. The bottom sequence shows the
packet sequence at connection closing of a loss-free web fetch,
while the top sequence shows the corresponding section from
a different fetch of the same web page that was subject to
packet loss and exhibits TCP retransmissions and DupACKs.
of later packets due to the action of TCP congestion control
(which reduces the send rate on packet loss) and retransmission
of the lost packets. For example, Figure 4 shows uplink
measurements of packet retransmissions and duplicate ACKs
at the end of two fetches of the same web page where it
can be seen that these have the effect of stretching the packet
sequence.
B. Derivative Dynamic Time Warping
Our interest is in a measure of the distance between packet
sequences which is insensitive to the types of distortion
introduced by the network, so that the distance between packet
streams t and t′ associated with fetches of the same web page
at different times is measured as being small, and ideally the
distance between fetches of different web pages is measured
to be large. To this end we use a variant of Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) [9]. DTW aims to be insensitive to differences
between sequences which are due to stretching/compressing of
time and so can be expected to at least partly accommodate
the effects of changes in download rate, queueing delay etc.
We define a warping path p to be a sequence of pairs,
{(pik, p
j
k)}, k = 1, 2, · · · , l with (pik, p
j
k) ∈ V := {1, · · · , n}×
{1, · · · ,m} satisfying boundary conditions pi1 = 1 = p
j
1,
pil = n, p
j
l = m and step-wise constraints (pik+1, p
j
k+1) ∈
V
pi
k
,p
j
k
:= {(u, v) : u ∈ {pik, p
i
k + 1} ∩ {1, . . . , n}, v ∈
{pjk, p
j
k + 1} ∩ {1, . . . ,m}}, k = 1, · · · , l − 1. That is, a
warping path maps points from one timestamp sequence to
another such that the start and end points of the sequences
match (due to the boundary conditions) and the points are
monotonically increasing (due to the step-wise constraints).
This is illustrated schematically in Figure 5, where the two
timestamp sequences to be compared are indicated to the left
and above the matrix and the bold line indicates an example
warping path.
n
m
j
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1
Fig. 5: Illustrating a warping path. The dashed lines indicate
the warping window.
Let P lmn ⊂ V l denote the set of all warping paths of
length l associated with two timestamp sequences of length
n and m respectively, and let Ct,t′(·) : P lmn → R be a
cost function so that Ct,t′(p) is the cost of warping path
p ∈ P lmn. Our interest is in the minimum cost warping path,
p∗(t, t′) ∈ argminp∈P lmn Ct,t′(p). In DTW the cost function
has the separable form Ct,t′(p) =
∑l
k=1 ct,t′(p
i
k, p
j
k) where
ct,t′ : V → R, in which case optimal path p∗(t, t′) be
efficiently found using the backward recursion,
(pik, p
j
k) ∈ arg min
(pi,pj)∈Vk
Ck+1 + ct,t′(p
i, pj) (1)
Ck = Ck+1 + ct,t′(p
i
k, p
j
k) (2)
where Vk = (pi, pj) ∈ {(u, v) : (pik+1, p
j
k+1) ∈ Vu,v}, k =
l − 1, l − 2, · · · and initial condition Cl = ct,t′(n,m). When
there is more than one optimal solution at step (1), we select
(pik, p
j
k) uniformly at random from amongst them.
A common choice of element-wise cost is the Euclidean
norm ct,t′(p
i, pj) = (tpi − t
′
pj
)2. However, in our data we
found that this cost can lead to all the elements of one
sequence that are beyond the last element of the other sequence
being matched to that single element. For this reason and also
to improve robustness to noise on the timestamp values (in
addition to misalignment of their indices), following [9] we
instead use the following element-wise cost
ct,t′(p
i, pj) = (Dt(p
i)−Dt′(p
j))2 (3)
where Dt(i) =
(ti−ti− )+(ti+−ti− )
2 , i
− = max{i − 1, 1} and
i+ = min{i + 1, |t|}. Observe that Dt(i) is akin to the
derivative of sequence t at index i. Further, we constrain
the warping path to remain within windowing distance w
of the diagonal (i.e. within the dashed lines indicated on
Figure 5) by setting C(p) = +∞ for paths p ∈ P lmn for
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Fig. 6: Example DTW alignment and warping paths between
two sequences vs cost function ct,t′ used, window w = 0.1.
In this example the length l of the warping path is 73 when a
Euclidean cost is used and 54 with the derivative cost.
which |pik − p
j
k| > max{wmin{n,m}, |m − n|} for any
k ∈ {1, · · · , l}.
Figure 6b illustrates the alignment of points between two
sequences obtained using this approach and for comparison
Figure 6a shows the corresponding result when using Eu-
clidean cost. The figure shows the warping paths on the right-
hand side and an alternative visualisation of the mapping
between points in the sequences on the left-hand side. Observe
that when Euclidean cost is used the warping path tends to
assign many points on one curve to a single point on the
other curve. As noted in [9] this is known to be a feature of
Euclidean cost. In comparison, use of the derivative distance
tends to mitigate this effect and select a warping path with
fewer horizontal and vertical sections.
C. F -Distance Measure
Given two timestamp sequences, the warping path is a mapping
between them. With reference to Figure 5, sections of the
warping path which lie parallel to the diagonal correspond
to intervals over which the two sequences are well matched.
Sections of the warping path that are parallel to the x- or y-
axes correspond to intervals over which the two sequences are
poorly matched. This suggests using the fraction of the overall
warping path which is parallel to the x- or y-axes as a distance
measure, which we refer to as the F -distance.
In more detail, let p = {(pik, p
j
k)}, k = 1, · · · , l be a
derivative DTW warping path relating timestamp sequences
t and t′, obtained as described in the previous section. We
partition the warping path into a sequence of subpaths within
each of which either pik or p
j
k remain constant and we count
the subpaths which are longer than one. For example, for
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Fig. 7: Illustrating method for calculating the F -distance
between two timestamp sequences.
the setup shown in Figure 7 there are five subpaths: (1, 1);
(2, 2), (2, 3); (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 4); (6, 5); (7, 6). Two of these
subpaths consist of more than one pair of points, namely
(2, 2), (2, 3) and (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 4), and these correspond,
respectively, to the vertical section and the horizontal section
on the corresponding warping path shown in Figure 7b.
Formally, define κ1 := 0 < κ2 < · · · < κr−1 < κr := l
such that for each s = 1, · · · , r − 1 (i) either pik1 = pik2
∀k1, k2 ∈ {κs + 1, · · · , κs+1} or p
j
k1
= pjk2 ∀k1, k2 ∈
{κs + 1, · · · , κs+1} and (ii) either κs+1 = l or condition
(i) is violated for some k1, k2 ∈ {κs, · · · , κs+1 + 1} i.e.
each subsequence is maximal. Note that pik 6= p
j
k for all
k = 1, · · · , l (due to warping path step-wise constraints) and
so in condition (i) it is not possible for both pik and pjk to be
constant. We are now is a position to define the F -distance
measure between timestamp sequences t and t′, namely:
φ(t, t′) :=
∑
s∈{1,...,r−1}
κs+1−κs>1
κs+1 − κs
n+m
(4)
where κs, s = 1, · · · , r are the constant subsequences in
minimal warping path p∗(t, t′). It can be seen that φ(p) takes
values in interval [0, 1], and is 0 when sequences t and t′ are
identical (in which case the warping path p lies on the diagonal
in Figure 5). For the example in Figure 7 the F -distance φ(p)
is (2 + 3)/13 = 0.385.
V. DE-ANONYMISING WEB FETCHES OVER AN
ETHERNET TUNNEL
In this section we present measurements of web page queries
carried out over an ethernet tunnel and evaluate the accuracy
with which the web page being fetched can be inferred using
only packet timing data. The entire project including codes,
scripts and datasets for all measurement campaigns is available
at [4]. The first dataset consists of home pages of each of the
top Irish health, financial and legal web sites as ranked by
www.alexa.com under its Regional/Europe/Ireland category in
November 2014. We prune the pages that fail to load and then
for each of the top 100 sites we carry out 100 fetches of the
index page yielding a total of 10,000 individual web page
fetches in a dataset. For comparison we collected two such
datasets, one where the pages of each web site are fetched
consecutively over an hour and a second where the pages
are fetched each hour over a period of five days. In these
datasets the browser cache is flushed between each fetch so
that the browser always starts in a fresh state. In addition, a
third dataset was collected consisting of the same 10,000 web
fetches but now without flushing of the browser cache between
fetches. The web pages were fetched over a period spanning
November 2014 to January 2015. A watir-webdriver
script on Firefox 36.0 was used to perform the web page
fetches and tcpdump to record the timestamps and direction
(uplink/downlink) of all packets traversing the tunnel although
only packet timestamps on the uplink were actually used.
A. Hardware/Software Setup
The network setup consists of a client that routes traffic to the
internet over a gigabit ethernet LAN. The client machine is a
Sony VGN-Z11MN laptop with an Intel core 2 duo 2.26GHz
CPU and 4GB of memory. It is running Ubuntu Linux 14.04
LTS Precise.
B. Classifying Measured Timestamp Sequences
We use the F -distance measure φ(·, ·) described in Section
IV to compare measured uplink timestamp sequences, with
windowing parameter w = 0.2 unless otherwise stated.
Figure 8 shows example scatter plots obtained using this
distance measure. In more detail, from the set Ti of measured
timestamp sequences for the i-th web site we select a sequence
ti which minimises
∑
t∈Ti
φ(t, ti) and then use ti as the
exemplar for the i-th web page. In Figure 8 we then plot
φ(t, ti) for each of the timestamp sequences t measured for
web page i and also for timestamp sequences measured for
another web page. In the example in Figure 8a it can be
seen that the distance measure is indeed effective at separating
the measured timestamp sequences of the two web pages
considered into distinct clusters, so potentially providing a
basis for accurately classifying timestamp sequences by web
page. Figure 8b shows an example of a scatter plot where the
separation between the two web pages is less distinct and so
classification can be expected to be less reliable. As we will
see, examples of this latter sort turn out to be fairly rare.
We considered two approaches for using φ(·, ·) to classify
timestamp sequences: K-Nearest Neighbours and Naive Bayes
Classification.
1) K-Nearest Neighbours: In this method, for each web page
i we sort the measured timestamp sequences t′ ∈ Ti used for
training in ascending order of sum-distance
∑
t∈Ti
φ(t, t′) and
select the top 3 to use as exemplars to represent this web page.
When presented with a new timestamp sequence, its distance to
the exemplars for all of the training web pages is calculated and
these distances are sorted in ascending order. Classification is
then carried out by majority vote amongst the top K matches.
2) Naive Bayes Classifier: For each web page i from the
measured timestamp sequences Ti used for training we select
ti ∈ argmint′∈Ti
∑
t∈Ti
φ(t, t′) (in addition we also consider
selecting ti to minimise the variance of the distance φ, see
below) and then fit a Beta distribution to the empirical distri-
bution of φ(t, ti) for t ∈ Ti. Let pi(·) denote the probability
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Fig. 8: Scatter plots for 4 different web pages using F -
distance measure φ. In (a) two relatively distinct web pages
are compared while the web pages in (b) are relatively similar.
distribution obtained in this way. When presented with a new
timestamp sequence t, we calculate the probability pi(t) of this
sequence belonging to web page i and select the web page for
which this probability is greatest.
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Fig. 10: Naive Bayes classification performance, no browser
caching.
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Fig. 9: K-Nearest Neighbours classification performance, no browser caching.
C. Experimental Results
We begin by presenting results for the dataset where pages are
fetched consecutively and the browser cache is flushed between
fetches. Figure 9 details the measured classification accuracy
using the K-NN approach, for various values of K . We use
10-fold cross validation, where the 100 samples of each web
site are divided into 10 random subsets and for each subset
we use the remaining 90 samples as the training data to find
the exemplars and use the 10 samples in the subset as the
validation data. The rates for these 10 subsets for each web
site are summarized and displayed in the figure. Each of the
boxes indicate the 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles and the lines
indicate the maximum and minimum values. The mean success
rates for K = 1, K = 3 and K = 5 are 95.01%, 94.97% and
94.98% respectively. These results for uplink traffic compares
to a maximum success rate of 92.5% when using packet
timestamps on the downlink for the classification, indicating
that use of uplink or downlink timestamps has little effect on
the performance of this classification attack. The results are
also compared for a subset of 50 web sites selected randomly
from the current 100, see Table I, which also confirms that the
effect of population size is minor.
For comparison, the success rates when web pages are
fetched hourly over 5 days are 90.88%, 90.72% and 90.74%.
Observe that there is a small (about 5%) reduction in success
rate, which we assume is associated with the time-varying na-
ture of some of the web sites. We discuss the effect of content
and speed variability on the performance in Section VII.
Figure 10 plots the corresponding results obtained using
the naive Bayes approach. Performance is calculated when
the exemplar for each web page is selected to minimise the
mean and the variance of the distance. The mean success rates
are 85.2% and 56.3% respectively. Since the performance is
consistently worse than that of the K-NN classifier we do not
consider the naive Bayes approach further in the rest of the
paper.
D. Standard vs. Cached: Different Versions of Same Web Page
On first visiting a new web page a browser requests all of the
objects that form the web page. However, on subsequent visits
many objects may be cached e.g. images, css and js files, etc. In
the Mozilla browser, when the address of a web page is simply
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Fig. 11: K-Nearest Neighbour classification performance, with
browser caching using 3 exemplars for each site. K = 5.
entered again shortly after the full page is fetched, since the
cached copy of an object has not yet expired the cached copy
will be used when rendering the web page and it will not be
fetched over the network by the browser. But the browser can
be forced to reload the web page by pressing F5 where it then
sends a request for the objects and the server may either return
an abbreviated NOT MODIFIED response if the cached object
is in fact still fresh or return the full object if it has changed.
Ultimately a full refresh can be induced by pressing Ctrl+F5
which requests for the full version of the web page as if no
object is cached before. Hence, the network traffic generated
by a visit to a web page may differ considerably depending
on whether it has been visited recently (so the cache is fresh)
or not.
Classification of cached web pages can be expected to be
more challenging than for non-cached pages since there is
less network traffic and so less data upon which to base
the classification decision. Figure 11 presents the measured
classification accuracy when browser caching is enabled. This
data is for the case where requests that reply with NOT
MODIFIED use the cached content, which is probably the
most common form of caching used in practice. It can be
seen that regardless of the small size of the network traffic in
this setup, the overall success rate for identifying web pages
remains in excess of 95%.
E. Web Pages Outside the Training Set
The experiments in the previous two sections are conducted
with the assumption that the adversary knows that the web
page that the user has visited is among the set of web pages for
which training data has been collected. When this assumption
need not hold, i.e. the user might have fetched a web page
outside of the adversary’s training database, then we can use
the following approach to first classify whether a measured
packet timestamp sequence t is associated with a web site in
the training set or not.
Recall that, as discussed in Section V-B1, for each web page
i in the training set we have 3 exemplar packet timestamp
sequences that are used for K-Nearest Neighbour classifica-
tion. Given a packet timestamp sequence t we use K-Nearest
Neighbour classification to estimate the nearest web page w(t)
within the training set and let Fmin(t) denote the minimum
F -distance between the exemplars for this web page and the
measured timestamp sequence. We can then use this value
as the basis for a simple classifier. Namely, when Fmin(t)
is greater than a specified threshold (which may depend on
w(t)) then we estimate t as lying outside the training set, and
when Fmin(t) is below the threshold then we estimate t as
lying within the training set. It remains to select an appropriate
threshold for each web page in the training set.
For every timestamp sequence t in the training set Figure
12 plots the distribution of Fmin(t) vs the index of the web
site for which t is measured. This figure is a box and whiskers
plot with the min, max and quartiles shown. For every web site
we then remove its data from the training set and repeat the
calculation. The distribution of these values is also shown in
Figure 12. It can be seen that, unsurprisingly, the F -distance
is consistently higher when a web site is excluded from the
training set. We select the threshold for classification to try to
separate these two sets of value. Namely, we take the average
of the x percentile of the lower values and the (100 − x)
percentile of the upper values as our threshold, where 0 ≤
x ≤ 100 is a design parameter.
The classification error rate vs the threshold parameter x
used is shown in Figure 13a. Two error rates are shown, firstly
the fraction of web pages which are outwith the training set
but which are classified as lying within it (which we refer to in
this section as false positives) and secondly the fraction of web
pages which are within the training set but which are classified
as lying outwith it (which we refer to as false negatives). The
standard deviations of these error rates across the web pages
is also shown in Figure 13b. It can be seen that thresholding
with x = 90 yields equal error false negative and false positive
rates of about 8.0%, which is close to the complement of the
reported success rate reported in the preceding section.
VI. MEASUREMENT RESULTS FOR OTHER CHANNELS
In this section we extend consideration from ethernet to a
number of different network channels. Namely, we consider
packet timestamp measurements taken from a commercial
femtocell carrying cellular wireless traffic, from a time-slotted
wired UDP channel (of interest as a potential defence against
timing analysis) and from the first hop (i.e. between the client
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Fig. 12: Distribution of the F -distance between the measured
packet timestamp sequences in the training dataset and the
exemplar packet sequences for the best guess. Data is shown
for when sequences of each web site are within the training
dataset and for when they are removed. Ethernet channel, no
browser caching.
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Fig. 13: Mean and standard deviation of false negative and
false positive error rates vs the choice of F -distance threshold
(specified via design parameter x).
and the Tor gateway) of a Tor channel. Similar to before, in
each case we collected packet timestamp data for 100 fetches
of the home pages of each of the top 100 Irish health, financial
and legal web sites as ranked by www.alexa.com.
A. Femtocell Traffic
A femtocell is an eNodeB cellular base station with a small
physical footprint (similar to a WiFi access point) and limited
cell size (typically about 30m radius). It is intended to improve
cellular coverage indoors, filling in coverage holes and im-
proving download rates, while also offloading traffic from the
macrocell network. Wired backhaul to the cellular operators
network is via a user supplied network connection e.g. a home
DSL line. Since femtocells are usually user installed, physical
access to the backhaul connection is straightforward and it is
a simple matter to route backhaul traffic via a sniffer. Mobile
operators are, of course, aware of this and backhaul traffic
is therefore secured via use of an IPSec encrypted tunnel. In
the setup considered here, the femtocell backhaul is over a
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Fig. 14: Femtocell K-Nearest Neighbours classification per-
formance, no browser caching, K = 5.
university gigabit ethernet connection and we used tcpdump
to log packets passing over this link.
1) Hardware/Software Setup: The client computer is the
same Sony laptop used for the ethernet measurements. It
now uses a Huawei K3770 HSPA USB Broadband Dongle
to connect wirelessly to the internet via a Femotcell. The
femtocell is a commercial Alcatel-Lucent 9361 Home Cell
V2-V device. The femtocell wired backhaul is connected to
a campus network via a NetGear EN 108 TP Ethernet hub.
A monitor computer which is running on a AMD Athlone
64 X2 Dual Core Proc 5000+ CPU and 4GB memory is also
connected to this hub and logs all packets. The client and
monitor computers both run Ubuntu Linux 14.04 LTS Precise.
2) Results: In contrast to the relatively clean ethernet chan-
nel considered in Section V-C, we found that traffic passing
over the wireless femtocell link is often distorted by factors
such as wireless and cellular noise, encoding/decoding delays,
cellular control plane traffic etc. These distortions typically
appear as shifts along the x-axis of the packet timestamp
patterns and/or as delays in the y-axis. The measured perfor-
mance using a K-NN classifier using 3 exemplars for each
site and K = 5 is shown in Figure 14. The mean success
rate is 91.8%, which compares with the mean success rate
of 95% observed in Section V-C when using a clean ethernet
channel. It can be seen that use of the wireless channel tends to
reduce the classification accuracy, as might be expected due to
the additional loss/delay over the wireless hop. However, the
reduction in accuracy is minor.
B. Time Slotted UDP Tunnel
We developed a custom tunnel using iptables,
netfilter and netfilter-queue. The tunnel
transports packets over a UDP channel in a time slotted
fashion and the slot size is a configurable parameter.
1) Hardware/Software Setup: The experimental setup is
identical to that used in Section V apart from the use of a
customised tunnel. On the client computer all web traffic is
captured using the OUTPUT netfilter hook, encapsulated
into UDP packets and sent to a server at the other side of the
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(a) Slot size: 1ms
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(b) Slot size: 10ms
Fig. 15: Time-slotted tunnel K-Nearest Neighbours classifica-
tion performance, no browser caching, K = 5.
tunnel. The server, which has an AMD Athlone 64 X2 Dual
Core Proc 5000+ and 4GB memory, fetches these UDP packets
using the PREROUTING hook, extracts the payload and sends
them by via the FORWARD hook to the outgoing ethernet
interface. Similarly, incoming packets from the internet are
encapsulated into UDP packets via FORWARD hook on the
server and sent to the client which captures them using the
PREROUTING hook, extracts the payload and forwards this
to the application layer.
2) Results: Figure 15 shows the measured performance
using a K-NN classifier where 3 exemplars are chosen from
each site and K = 5. The overall success rate is 88% when
the tunnel slot size is 1ms and 63% when the tunnel slot size
is increased to 10ms. We also considered slot sizes larger
than 10ms, but since we found such that large slot sizes
tended adversely affect browser performance (and so would
likely be problematic in practice) we do not include them
here. This performance compares with a success rate of 95%
over a plain ethernet tunnel. As might be expected, time-
slotting decreases the classification success rate since it adds
timing “noise”. However, even with a relatively large slot
size of 10ms the impact on performance is not proportional
to the sacrifice we make in terms of delay and throughput
(with such a large slot size we are capping the downlink
throughput to 150KB/s). This approach therefore appears to
be unappealing as a practical defence against the timing-based
attack considered here. Of course more sophisticated types of
defence may be more effective, but we leave consideration of
those to future work as they likely involve complex trade-offs
between network performance and resistance to attack that we
lack space to address here.
C. Tor Network
In this section we consider measurements of web page queries
over the Tor network. Tor is an overlay network of tunnels that
aims to improve privacy and security on the internet.
1) Hardware/Software Setup: The experimental setup is the
same as in Section V except that the traffic from the client
browser, Mozilla Firefox 36.0 is proxified over Tor v0.2.5.11.
Note that we also explored use of the Tor browser but found
that a significant subset of the web sites failed to load, timed
out or required a CAPTCHA to be solved for each page fetch
which created complications when scripting fetches. We also
investigated using Firefox with Tor pluggable transports (such
as obfs4 etc.) but we found that using these add-ons had a
huge impact on delay such that most web sites fail to load
even after 5 minutes. As before, the browser cache is flushed
between fetches.
2) Randomised Routing: Tor uses randomised routing of
traffic over its overlay network in an attempt to make linking of
network activity between source and destination more difficult.
It can be expected that rerouting will have a significant impact
on the timestamp sequence measured during a web fetch
since changes in path propagation have a direct impact on
the time between an outgoing request and receipt of the
corresponding server response, and also impact TCP dynamics
since congestion window growth slows with increasing RTT.
Differences in loss rate, queueing delay etc. along different
routes are also likely to impact measured timestamp sequences.
The impact of Tor rerouting on measured RTT is illustrated
in Figure 16, which plots the mean and max delay between
sending of a TCP data packet and receipt of the corresponding
TCP ACK for repeated fetches of the same web page (although
this information is not available to an attacker, in our tests it is
of course available for validation purposes). Abrupt, substantial
changes in the mean RTT are evident, especially in Figure 16b.
These changes persist for a period of time as Tor only performs
rerouting periodically.
Figure 17 illustrates the impact of Tor on the packet times-
tamps measured during a web page fetch.
3) Results: Figure 18 details the measured classification
accuracy using the K-NN approach, where 3 exemplars are
chosen from each site and a window size of w = 0.2
is used to accommodate the warping between samples. The
mean success rate is 56.2% which compares with the mean
success rate of 95.0% when using a clean ethernet channel.
As might be expected, use of the Tor network significantly
reduces classification accuracy. However, the success rate of
56.2% compares with a baseline success rate of 1% for a
random classifier over 100 web sites and so still is likely to
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Fig. 16: Mean and max RTTs measured during 100 fetches
of the web page www.medicalcouncil.ie. Changes due to Tor
rerouting are evident. The max RTT in (b) is in fact the idle
time between when the last packet is received until the browser
is closed, hence why it is significantly larger than the mean
RTT plotted in (a).
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Fig. 17: Time traces of uplink traffic measured when fetching
www.medicalcouncil.ie . Measurements are shown both when
using vanilla Firefox and when using Firefox with the Tor
plugin.
represent a significant compromise in privacy. We note also
that this compares favourable with the 54.6% rate reported by
Panchenko et al in [14] against Tor traffic using packet size
and direction information.
Channel Number ofExemplars
Database
size
K
1 3 5 7
Ethernet
5 100 95.27% 95.65% 95.86% 95.74%
3 100 95.01% 94.97% 94.98% -
3 100∗ 90.88% 90.72% 90.74% -
1 100 93.37% - - -
3 50 97.16% 97.18% 97.04% -
Ethernet (Downlink) 3 100 92.47% 91.64% 90.79% -
Cached 3 100 95.88% 95.30% 95% -
Slotted 1ms 3 100 89.23% 88.25% 87.98% -10ms 3 100 63.73% 61.40% 63.35% -
Femtocell 3 100 92.60% 91.80% 91.83% -
Tor 3 100 58.44% 56.18% 56.2% -
TABLE I: Summary of the measured success rate of the proposed attack reported here. Data is shown for different numbers of
exemplars, different population sizes and different values of K in the K-nearest neighbours method. In all cases the samples of
each web site are fetched consecutively within an hour except for (∗) where a sample is taken each hour for 5 days.
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Fig. 18: Tor network K-Nearest Neighbours classification
performance, no browser caching, K = 5.
D. Other Proposed Channels
A number of other channels have been proposed in the litera-
ture as a defence against traffic analysis attacks. Wright et al
[18] suggest a traffic morphing method which maps the packet
sizes of one web site to the packet distribution of another
site. This defence fails to overcome the attack considered
here since it makes use only of timing information and does
not use packet size information. This is also the case for all
of the packet-size based defences proposed in the HTTPOS
scheme introduced in [12]. A potential defence against timing
attacks is to modify the packet timing pattern by delaying
transmissions. However, although this might be expected to
counter timing-based attacks such as that considered here such
defences will also have an impact on delay. For example,
BuFLO introduced in [3] is similar to the time slotting method
that we consider above and which appears to be impractical
given its substantial impact on delay and bandwidth, with
190% bandwidth overhead reported in [16].
VII. EFFECT OF LINK SPEED AND CONTENT CHANGE ON
CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE
By looking closely at performance of websites, it can be seen
that the total mean success rate obtained in each measurement
campaign is not monotone amongst individual websites. In
this section, we investigate possible reasons behind the poor
performance of certain websites. We use the same ethernet
dataset from Section V-C where samples are fetched hourly
over 5 days. The study of other scenarios like femtocell, cached
etc. provides similar results.
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Fig. 19: Scatter plot of max link speed standard deviation and
median against success rate. Samples are taken hourly for 5
days over ethernet channel.
1) Network Speed. The link speed between the client and
each web server varies from a website to another. It is
also different between samples of the same page. To in-
vestigate the effect of network speed on the classification
performance, we calculated peak downlink speed during
each fetch (the results for uplink and uplink+downlink
speed is similar). Then in order to compare the metrics,
values for samples of each page are normalized and their
variance is evaluated. Figure 19a illustrates the scatter plot
of normalized standard deviation of link speed against
success rate of each website. It can be seen there is no
strong correlation between these two metrics that would
suggest that a web site with more variable link speed
should result a lower success rate. Similar comparison is
also studied with median speed for each web site (Figure
19b) to show that having an overall faster link speed does
not guarantee a poor classification performance.
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Fig. 20: Scatter plot of sample length and GET/POST request
count standard deviation against success rate. Samples are
taken hourly for 5 days over ethernet channel.
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Fig. 21: Scatter plot of median open IP connections and active
ports count against success rate. Samples are taken hourly for
5 days over ethernet channel.
2) Sample Length and GET/POST Requests Count. For each
web site we plot the standard deviation of the normalized
number of uplink packets (a measure of the variability
of the web page over time) and the corresponding suc-
cess rate (see Figure 20a). The results for uplink and
uplink+downlink is similar. We also provided the same
plot for maximum number of GET/POST requests for
each website (Figure 20b). It can be seen that, there is no
strong correlation between the these metrics and success
rates which is suggestive that the classification attack is
fairly insensitive to variability of web page content over
time.
3) IP Connections, Active TCP ports. In order to investigate
the robustness of the attack against parallel connections,
for each web site we plot the median number of serving
IP connections and active TCP ports against their corre-
sponding success rates. As illustrated in Figures 21a and
21b, again there is no clear correlation between mentioned
metrics which is suggestive that the number of active
IPs/ports for each web site, which represents the number
of parallel connections, has no effect on the performance
of our proposed attack.
The above results suggest that there is no strong correlation
between the performance of our attack and link speed, small
content change and number of parallel connections. However
the choice of exemplars are essential to the performance of
the attack. In particular when the content change is more than
a threshold, the difference between samples can no longer be
ignored by the attack. An example of this misbehaviour can be
seen for website #10 in the measurement campaign considered
in this section, where 2 different versions of the page were
observed during the experiment. In result, 1 exemplar repre-
sents one version while 2 others represent another version of
the page. This causes K-NN method to fail collecting enough
votes for a successful classification, which in turn leads to a
success rate of 31%.
To overcome this issue, separate sets of exemplars are
required to represent each version of a web page in order to
successfully classify future samples.
VIII. FINDING A WEB PAGE WITHIN A SEQUENCE OF
WEB REQUESTS
In the experiments presented so far we have assumed that
within the observed packet timestamp stream the boundaries
between different web fetches are known. This is probably a
reasonable assumption on lightly loaded links where the link is
frequently idle between web fetches. However, not only might
this assumption be less appropriate on more heavily loaded
links but it also allows for a relatively straightforward means
of defence, namely insertion of dummy packets to obscure the
boundaries between web fetches. In this section we therefore
extend consideration to links where web fetches are carried out
in a back to back fashion such that the boundaries between web
fetches cannot be easily identified.
The basic idea is to sweep through a measured stream of
packet timestamps trying to match sections of it against the
timing signature of a web page of interest. This exploits the
fact that our timing-only attack does not fundamentally depend
on knowledge of the start/end times of the web fetch (unlike
previous approaches which use packet counts to classify web
pages).
In more detail, to locate a target web page within a stream
of packet timestamps we first select three measured packet
timestamp sequences for that web page to act as exemplars (as
previously). Then, we sweep through the stream of timestamps
in steps of 10 packets, extract a section of the stream of
the same length as each exemplar (plus 10 to cover the step
size) and calculate the distance between the section and the
exemplar. After sweeping through the full stream we select
the location within the stream with least distance from the
exemplars as the likely location of the target web page within
the stream. While this process assumes that the target web page
is present within the packet stream, using a similar approach
to that in Section V-E we could extend this approach to decide
whether the web page is present by appropriately thresholding
the distance (when the measured least distance is above the
threshold, the page is judged to not be present in the stream).
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Fig. 22: Illustrating locating of a web page within a packet stream. The page www.iscp.ie shown in red triangles is an example
of a web page which is successfully located among 2, 3, 4 and 5 consecutive web fetches. The vertical lines show the first SYN
packet of each web page.
A. Results
We constructed a test dataset as follows. For each run we pick
one of the 100 web sites to be the target. We then uniformly at
random pick up to 4 other web sites from the remaining web
sites. The selected web sites are then permuted randomly and
fetched one after another with a pause after each fetch acting
as a “thinking period”. The maximum time allowed for each
fetch to complete is 25 seconds i.e the length of each pause
is selected uniformly at random from 5-25 seconds. Repeating
this for all web sites in the dataset, we created 100 test runs.
No. of consecutive pages 2 3 4 5
Success rate 82% 80% 66% 64%
TABLE II: Success rates of locating web pages among 2-5
fetches.
Using the classification approach described above we at-
tempted to identify the location within each packet stream.
Figure 22 presents four examples of this, showing the position
within a stream with least distance from the exemplars of a
target web page. The success rate results for streams of 2-5
web sites are summarized in Table II. With this approach we
achieved a maximum success rate of 82% for locating the
target web page within each packet stream within a position
error of w.ls packets, where w is the window size at which
DTW operates (0.2 in our setting) and ls is the average length
of the 3 exemplars which are determined for each web site s
separately. Given the limited information being used, this is a
remarkably high success rate and indicates the power of the
timing-only attack. However, it can be seen that the success
rate starts to lower as the number of consecutive fetches grows
which leads to a longer packet stream that can potentially
include similar patterns to the target web page. Moreover web
pages with shorter length are less likely to be located properly
due to their shorter signatures which are more likely to appear
in the middle of a larger web trace.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic that
makes use only of packet timing information on the uplink.
In addition, unlike existing approaches this timing-only attack
does not require knowledge of the start/end of web fetches
and so is effective against traffic streams. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of the attack against both wired and wireless
traffic, consistently achieving mean success rates in excess of
90%. Table I summarises our measurements of the success rate
of the attack over a range of network conditions.
Study of downlink and a preliminary study of up-
link+downlink traffic suggest little difference from uplink
results presented in this paper, given timing patterns of uplink
and downlink are strongly correlated. Moreover, the proposed
attack proves to be robust against different link speed, different
number of parallel connections and small content change,
being able to maintain overall success rate of 91% for measure-
ments collected over a course of 5 days. However the threshold
for which the attack remains resilient to content change is to
be studied. we leave further investigation of these matters for
future work.
Since this attack only makes use of packet timing infor-
mation it is impervious to existing packet padding defences.
We show that time slotting is also insufficient to prevent
the attack from achieving a high success rate, even when
relatively large time slots are used (which might be expected
to significantly distort packet timing information). Similarly,
randomised routing as used in Tor is also not effective. More
sophisticated types of defence may be more effective, but we
leave consideration of those to future work as they likely
involve complex trade-offs between network performance (e.g.
increased delay and/or reduced bandwidth) and resistance to
attack that warrant more detailed study than is possible here.
In addition to being of interest in its own right, by highlight-
ing deficiencies in existing defences this timing-only attack
points to areas where it would be beneficial for VPN designers
to focus further attention.
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